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IN THE SUPREM-E COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT 
COMP ANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DAVID FRANK PATTERSON and 
PEARL PATTERSON, his wife, Case No. 
F. DAVID PATTERSON and 12968 
MARIE PATTERSON, his wife, 
LK\iVIS B. PATTERSON and 
RAM.ONA PATTERSON, his wife, 
JACK D. PATTERSON and 
JOAN PATTERSON,his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a determination of damages 
incident to the exercise of the power of eminent domain 
by Utah Power & Light Company. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
At the commencement of trial, the district judge 
ruled that, with respect to the "Dix Place," the appe[. 
lants were entitled to recover any severance damage~ ' 
shown to have been ~mstained. The appellants' expert 
witness testified to a substantial severance damage. 
However, the respondent's expert witness testified to no 
severance damage based upon his instruction that the ; 
appellants were not legally entitled to severance dam-
age. Upon cross examination, the respondent's expert 
I 
witness admitted that the appellants sustained severance 
damage if legally permitted. 
The district judge refused to strike the testimony 
of respondent's expert witness on the ground that it was 
based upon erroneous principles of law. The jury verdict ' 
included no severance damage to the "Dix Place." By 
order dated June 7, 1972, the district judge denied ap· 
pellants' motion for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek to have the issue of damages to the , 
"Dix Place" reversed and remanded for a new trial. All 
other issues have been resolved. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case intially involved four tracts of land in 
f h. h ontiguous Clinton, Davis County-three o w ic were c 
2 
---
(Tr. 9). Each of these four tracts was subject to a sepa-
rate Right of vV ay Easement held by respondent Utah 
Power & Light Company (R. 1-9, Ex. A-D). The ease-
ment on the "Dix Place" was granted in 1913 (R. 1-9, 
Ex. A), and the others were issued at about that same 
time. Each of these easements permitted Utah Power & 
Light Company to erect subsequent transmission lines 
within the described right of way upon the payment of 
certain damages (R. 1-9, Ex. A-D). However, the dam-
ages required to be paid by each instrument differed 
materially (R. 1-9, Ex. A-D). 
The Right of Way Easement granted by the Dix 
people contained a broader damage provision than the 
other easements. It required Utah Power & Light Com-
pany and its predecessor " ... to save and keep the said 
parties of the first part (Dix), and each of them, their 
and each of their heirs, executors, administrators or as-
signs, harmless of and from all damages which they or 
either of them, may suffer as a result of the exercise of 
the right, privilege and authority herein granted wnd to 
pay all damages which the said parties of the first part 
(Dix) and each of them, their and each of their heirs, 
executors, administrators, or assigns may suffer, from 
the construction, erection, operation, maintenance, or re-
pair of, or damage or injury by, any tower or towers, 
... line or lines, or other thing placed on said premises 
above described under the right, privilege and authority 
herein granted, . . . ( R. 1-9, Ex. A) (Emphasis added) . 
After considerable discussion between the court 
and counsel at the commencement of trial, it was ruled 
3 
that the Dix easement required the payment of "all d . 
ages," including severance (Tr. 7). Damages on~~ 
o.ther three tracts were limited essentially to construe~ 
hon damage to crops and livestock, and specifically ex-
cluded severance damage (Tr. 5). 
The testimony in this case reflects that the "Dix 
Place" contained 80 acres (Tr. 9), and was used in con-
nection with other tracts as part of a livestock fattening 
operation (Tr. 11). No cattle were kept on the "Dix 
Place" (Tr. 18) ; instead, the "Dix Place" was utilized 
for the production of corn to be fed on another tract (Tr. 
51). Through this tract Utah Power & Light Company 
constructed a transmission line utilizing large steel 
towers (Tr. 18). 
The appellants called Haven J. Barlow as an ex-
pert valuation witness (Tr. 69) . He testified that the 
"Dix Place" was in a transitional stage from agricultural 
to residential use (Tr. 73), and that under either use, 
the construction of the new transmission line had an ad-
verse effect upon the property (Tr. 7 5). After giving 
his reasons for this adverse effect, Mr. Barlow gave his 
opinion as to the diminution in fair market value of the 
Dix property. Mr. Barlow approached this severance 
damage from the standpoint of both agricultural and 
residential use (Tr. 79-80). In Mr. Barlow's opinion the 
"Dix Place" had sustained a severance damage of 
$13,000.00 (Tr. 81). 
Mr. Barlow's testimony was substantiated by Lewis 
Wh ·1 M Pat· Patterson, one of the property owners. 1 e r. 
4 
c 
tcrson gave no monetary amount as to the total severance 
damages sustained, he did explain the impact to his 
farming operation by the construction of the transmis-
sion line and towers (Tr. 35-46), and gave the annual 
cost of curing the various problems (Tr. 45). 
The respondent called Marcellus Palmer as an ex-
pert valuation witness (Palmer Tr. 2). Mr. Palmer test-
ified that he had made a field investigation according to 
certain instructions (Palmer Tr. 5) and had been ad-
vied by counsel as to the uses permitted of the Dix ease-
ment without the payment of damages (Palmer Tr. 10). 
Mr. Palmer concluded that the property had not been 
additionally burdened (Palmer Tr. 10 and 11). Upon 
cross examination, Mr. Palmer admitted that substantial 
severance damage would be sustained by the Pattersons 
should the easement be intepreted to permit the recovery 
of all damages (Palmer Tr. 22). 
Appellants moved the court for the striking of all 
Mr. Palmer's testimony insofar as it related to the Dix 
property (Tr. 95). This motion was based upon the 
ground that Mr. Palmer's testimony was premised upon 
a legal assumption contrary to the ruling of the court 
and the express wording of the 1913 easement (Tr. 95). 
This motion was denied (Tr. 96). 
The jury answered an interrogatory to the effect 
that the "Dix Place" sustained no damage in its fair 
market value ( R. 7 4) • 
5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFF'S WIT. 
NESS MARCELLUS PALMER WAS BASED 
UPON LEGAL ASSUMPTIONS CONTRARY 
TO THE RULINGS OF THE COURT, AND 
SUCH TESTIMONY SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
STRICKEN AS MOVED BY THE DEFEND. 
ANTS DURING TRIAL. 
At the commencement of the trial, the court prop· 
erly involved itself with the interpretation of the four 
easements (Tr. 2). The parties substantially agreed as 
to the interpretation of three of these easements (Tr. 4), 
but the fourth, the Dix easement, presented an issue of 
construction. This issue was clearly stated by the court 
and counsel (Tr. 5 and 6): 
THE COURT: And we need an interpretation of the 
Dix one as to what "all damages" means? 
MR. AX.LAND: Specifically if it includes severance 
damages to the extent of the defendants allegations 
of placing an additional burden upon that ground 
by the construction of a second right-of-way, and 
any resultant diminution in property value because 
of that burden. 
Plaintiff's counsel argued the position that the Dix 
easement excluded severance damage (Tr. 3) , while de· 
D . ent per· fendants' counsel argued that the ix easem 
6 
x 
~· 
r· 
-
mitted the recovery of severance damage (Tr. 4) . At the 
conclusion of counsel's argument, the Court made its 
ruling interpreting the language of the Dix easement 
(Tr. 7): 
THE COURT: All right. My interpretation of the Dix 
agreement is that the phrasing "all damages" opens 
it up. It means, as stated, "all damages." 
MR. AXLAND: Will the court then hear severance 
damages, in addition? 
THE COURT: I will in regard to the Dix easement. 
MR. AXLAND: I would like the record to reflect an 
objection to that holding. 
THE COURT: Let it show that they have been argued 
two hours on that same objection. 
I think the special phrasing of the Dix one puts it in 
a different category and that "all" means "all." 
This ruling of the court was entirely proper since it 
involved the interpretation of a document where the only 
doubt as to its meaning arose from the language of the 
parties and not from extrinsic matters. Such an interpre-
tation from the four corners of a document is consistent 
with the expressions of this Court in Ephraim Theatre 
Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221 
( 1958) , and with the general rule as stated in 53 Am. 
J ur., Trial, Section 266: 
"'Vhere a contract is to be construed by its terms 
alone, it is the duty of the court to intepret it, but 
7 
where its meaning is obscure and its const t' 
d d h '. . . rue ton 
.epen . s upon ot. er a?d extrms1c facts in connec. 
hon ~1th what is written, the question of inter. 
pretat10n should be submitted to the J. ury und ·tr. ,, 'er proper ms uctions. • • • 
The issue of severance damages having been de. 
cided by the court, it was not thereafter in issue for de. 
termination by the jury. The issue remaining for resolu. 
tion by the jury was the amount of severance damage 
and not whether severance damage was legally per. 
mitted. 
Notwithstanding this ruling by the court, the plain. 
tiff introduced testimony premised upon a contrary in-
terpretation of the Dix easement. Mr. Marcellus Palmer 
was called by the plaintiff as an expert valuation witness. 
When asked on direct examination if he had made an 
appraisal of the property, Mr. Palmer answered that he 
had "made a field investigation and made some deter· 
minations according to ... instruction~ ... " (Palmer Tr. 
5). Mr. Palmer testified that he had been advised by 
counsel as to the legal effect of the easement (Palmer 
Tr. IO). Mr. Palmer then testified that the Dix parcel 
had not been subjected to any additional burden or use 
and therefore the market value of the remaining prop· 
erty was unaffected (Palmer Tr. 10 and 11): 
"A. First of all as to the reasons, we have an easement 
here, and I have been advised by counsel that it is a 
legal and legitimate easement, and it provided ~er· 
tain uses, not use. As I understand it, it provides 
certain uses that would travel along with the real 
8 
d 
property in that easement from then on, and in my 
opinion the construction of a second power line 
within the bounds of the easement did not create 
anything new and different as to the remaining 
property, the supporting properties along the side 
of the easement, because it was already provided in 
the easement. I see no additional uses there that 
affects the marketability of the remaining prop-
erty." 
On cross examination Mr. Palmer was asked to 
assume that the proper interpretation of the easement 
permitted the recovery of all damages caused by the 
placement of a second transmission line at such time as 
that second line was installed (Palmer Tr. 22). Mr. 
Palmer then answered in the affirmative that substantial 
severance damage would result under such a legal in-
terpretation. 
"Q. But I am asking you to assume. Let's assume that 
the interpretation of the language of the easement 
on the Dix farm specified, aside from the construc-
tion damages, that the damages, all damages, caused 
by the placement of the towers and the lines on this 
second power line should be determined and paid 
when that line goes in. Then it would; would it not, 
be a case that you would have substantial severance 
damages if that were the legal interpretation? 
A. If that were the legal interpretation, and using your 
assumption. 
Q Yes. 
9 
"""' 
A. Yes, that could be, depending on the legal interpre. 
tation of the document. 
Q. All right. Let's assume that that is the legal interpre-
tation. 
MR. AXLAND: If the court please, for the record 
may I have a continuing objection based upon the 
ruling of the court in chambers this morning on this 
line of questioning? 
THE COURT: I think you made your point this mor-
ning, yes. 
MR. AXLAND: Well, yes. 
THE COURT: You mean you want to object to this 
based on what went on this morning to his line of 
questioning at this time? 
MR. AXLAND: Yes. 
THE COURT: Yes, of course. 
Q. (By Mr. Fuller) All right. Now, if we take that as· 
sumption, Mr. Palmer, and assume that wehadone 
tower line and an easement with nothing on it ex· 
cept that, and then we were to be paid for the dam· 
ages for the additional towers and lines that woula 
constitute a severance situation; wouldn't it? 
A. Oh, yes, it sure would." 
From a study of the transcript it is clear that ~fr 
Palmer premised his testimony on an erroneous principle 
of law which was contrary to the ruling of the court. Mr 
10 
Palmer freely stated that he had proceeded according to 
instructions and that he had been advised by counsel as 
to the legal effect of the Dix easement. Counsel's inter-
pretation, as argued before the Court at the commence-
ment of trial was that there had been no "loss to the de-
fendants in this matter because of severance or the im-
position of an additional burden ... " (R. 3). Likewise, 
when asked on direct examination "whether or not the 
creation of the second power transmission line in 1968 
created an additional burden on the remaining ground 
within the Dix parcel and therefore reduced the fair 
market value of that remaining ground ... ," Mr. Palm-
er answered that in his opinion "the construction of a 
second power line within the bounds of the easement did 
not create anything new and different as to the remain-
ing property ... " (Tr. 10). 
Upon direct examination counsel put before his 
witness the precise legal question which had already 
been decided by the Court. The question asked was 
"whether . . . the second power transmission line . . . 
created an additional burden ... " (Tr. 10). This ques-
tion was posed in complete disregard of the prior ruling 
of the court. The court had ruled that severance damages 
were compensable under the easement and that the de-
fendants were entitled to "all damages" arising by rea-
son of the construction of the second transmission line 
(Tr. 7). The court's ruling, in effect, was that the con-
struction of the second transmission line created an addi-
tional burden for which compensation could be re-
rovered. Certainly the judge would not have ruled that 
11 
damages could be recovered if he had not recognized an 
injury or additional burden. The injury or additional 
bur~en i~ and was a ph,ysica~ reality. Counsel's attempt 
to cucumvent the court s rulmg by speaking in tenns of 
injury or burden instead of damage should not be coun. 
tenanced by this Court. Injury is presumed by the very 
recognition of damage compensation. 
Mr. Palmer's "'field investigation" was not an ap-
praisal at all; it was merely a recitation of counsel's in-
structions that no severance damages were required un-
der an interpretation of the easement. This was conceded 
on cross examination. There Mr. Palmer admitted that 
substantial damages would result under a different legal 
interpretation (Palmer Tr. 22). Mr. Palmer's testimony 
did not go to the issue of the amount of severance dam-
age; instead, it went to an issue which had been decided 
by the court and taken from the jury. 
Such testimony which does not tend to establish or 
disprove a matter in issue is properly excluded as being 
immaterial. In the words of McCormick on Evidence, 
Section 152, 
"If the evidence offered to prove a proposition 
which is not a matter in issue nor probative of 3 
matter in issue, the evidence is properly said to be 
immaterial. . . ." 
Such evidence being immaterial, it should have been 
stricken by the court as moved by the defendants. The 
d n erro· testimony given by Mr. Palmer was base upon a 
· t then k neous legal assumption and went to an issue no 
12 
fore the Court. This Court indicated in State Road 
Comm. v. Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P. 2d 347 (1968), 
that an expert opinion on a matter not properly before 
the court or manifesting palpable ignorance of the sub-
ject matter should be stricken. The law is similarly stated 
in 88 C. J. S., Trial, Section 134: 
"Accordingly, evidence may be stricken on mo-
tion ... where the evidence bears on an issue 
which has been withdrawn or dismissed, ... " 
In this case common sense would dictate that some 
damage would occur by reason of the construction of a 
transmission line and large steel towers. Under the trial 
court's interpretation of the 1913 easement, the land-
owners were entitled to recover "all damages" (Tr. 7). 
Plaintiffs appraiser obviously proceeded under an inter-
pretation contrary to that made by the court. 
POINT II. 
THE JURY VERDICT, AS IT RELATED TO 
THE "DIX PLACE," 'VAS NOT WITHIN THE 
RANGE OF COMPETENT TESTIMONY PRE-
SENTED AT TRIAL. 
The testimony of Marcellus Palmer, having gone to 
an issue which had been withdrawn, was immaterial, and 
this testimony, having been premised upon an erroneous 
understanding of law, was similarly incompetent. 
Such incompetent testimony, whether stricken or 
not, will not sustain a jury verdict. This principle of law, 
13 
that the verdict must be within the range of com t . . peen\ 
testllllony, is elementary and has been stated in numer. 
ous ~ppellate decisions. This principle of law applies 
particularly to condemnation cases where the range of 
testimony from expert witnesses is often quite broad: 
• 
"Ordinarily, a verdict or award in a condemna. 
tion case will be sustained if, and only if it is 
within the range of the testimony of the a~ount 
of the value or damages .... " 27 Am. Jur. 2d 
Eminent Domain, Section 471. ' 
In the Utah case of State Road Comm. v. Silliman I 
supra, the jury award of severance damage was outside 
the range of testimony; except in that case it was exces· 
sive. The highest figure of any witness was $12,487.50; 
the jury awarded severance damages of $15,023.50. This 
Court held that the trial judge had abused his discretion 
in not granting a new trial: 
"The instant case is a good illustration of the 
principle that the verdict canot stand when it 
clearly shows that it was given either under the 
influence of passion or prejudice or under a Uick 
of understanding of the law as it applies to sev· 
erance damanges. (Emphasis added.) 
In Pierson v. Commonwealth, 350 S. W. 2d 487, 
489 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961), just as in the Silliman case, 
the total award was within the range of testimony but 
the severance item alone was not. In both cases the cowis 
considered the error to have remained uncured by the 
fact that the overall award was within the range of testi· 
mony. In both cases the award of severance was held not 
to be supported by the evidence. The Kentucky Courl 
14 
quoted from 5 Nichou on Eminent Domain, Section 
17.l (4): 
"Where the amount of one or more of the items of 
damage awarded in a condemnation case is dem-
onstrably erroneous it is not legitimated by the 
fact that the overall amount of the award is with-
in the range of the testimony." (Citing author-
ity). 
In Garvin v. State Road Dept., 149 So. 2d 869, 871, 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963), the condemnor's appraiser 
premised his appraisal upon erroneous information-
just as in the instant case. In that case the state's apprais-
er had been instructed that certain gasoline tanks and 
pumps did not belong to the defendant. The state's ap-
praiser came in at $30,060.00, and he testified that such 
figure included nothing for the gasoline tanks and 
pumps. A defendant landowner testified that he owned 
the tanks and pumps. This testimony was uncontrovert-
ed. The jury verdict was $30,060.00, the exact figure 
testified to by the state's appraiser. In reversing and re-
manding that case, the court stated the following reason: 
"It is our view that in the instant case the jury, in 
adopting the exact figure testified to by the con-
demnor' s appraiser, specifically excluding any 
compensation for the defendants' said tanks and 
pumps, awarded no compensation for these items. 
This being so, the defendants have not received 
'just compensation.' " 
The Garvin case and the instant case have several 
similarities. In both cases the condemnor's appraiser 
htified to certain erroneous information pursuant to 
15 
instructions. In both cases the award came in at th . . . e exact 
figure testified to by the condemnor's appraiser. Be. 
cause of the erroneous premise for the testimony in each 
case, the landowners' respective evidence was left tin· 
controverted by competent testimony. The verdicts were 
then not within the range of testimony. Stated another 
way, the jury in each case ignored credible uncontro. 
verted evidence. 
Several Utah cases have been concerned with the 
propriety of disregarding credible uncontroverted evi. 
dence. In Page v. Federal Security Ins. Co., 8 Utah2d 
226, 332 P. 2d 666, 669 ( 1958) , this Court held that the 
trier of the facts could not "arbitrarily disregard credible 
uncontroverted evidence. . .. " In Jones v. California 
Packing Corp., 121 Utah 612, 244 P. 2d 640, 64! 
(1952), this Court elaborated further: 
"However, where facts are proved by uncontra· 
dieted testimony of competent disinterested wit· 
nesses and there is nothing inherently umeason· 
able, nor any circumstance which would tend to 
raise do but of its truth, it should be taken as estab· 
lished. Refusal to do so is an arbitrary disre~ard 
by the trier of the facts, ... " (Citing authority.) 
Where the jury verdict is not within the range or 
competent testimony, it becomes the duty of the trial 
judge to grant a new trial. 27 Am. J ur. 2d, Eminenl 
Domain, Section 448. Failure of the trial court to 8.
0 
grant a new trial is an abuse of discretion as held by thii 
Court in State Road Comm. v. Silliman, supra. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has repeatedly referred in appellate de-
cisions to its reluctance to reverse a judgment after the 
parties have had their day in court. However, it should 
be recognized that the making of a jury verdict does not 
insure justice. This Court with its higher authority was 
established for the very purpose of correcting errors in 
the trial process-whether they be made by judge or 
JUry. 
The error here is obvious; it was created by the de-
liberate disregard of the court's ruling that "all damages" 
were compensable. The trial judge's fond hopes, that the 
verdict would generally satisfy the defendants and that 
they would overlook the obvious error, have not materi-
alized. In other words, the defendants have been denied 
"just compensation." 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
ORV AL C. HARRISON 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court has repeatedly referred in appellate de-
cisions to its reluctance to reverse a judgment after the 
parties have had their day in court. However, it should 
be recognized that the making of a jury verdict does not 
insure justice. This Court with its higher authority was 
established for the very purpose of correcting errors in 
the trial process-whether they be made by judge or 
JUry. 
The error here is obvious; it was created by the de-
liberate disregard of the court's ruling that "all damages" 
were compensable. The trial judge's fond hopes, that the 
verdict would generally satisfy the defendants and that 
they would overlook the obvious error, have not materi-
alized. In other words, the defendants have been denied 
"just compensation." 
Respectfully submitted, 
GLEN E. FULLER 
ORV AL C. HARRISON 
15 East 4th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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